This paper aims to clarify the consequences of new scientific and philosophical approaches for the practical-theoretical framework of modern developmental biology. I highlight normal development, and the instructive-permissive distinction, as key parts of this framework which shape how variation is conceptualised and managed. Furthermore, I establish the different dimensions of biological variation: the units, temporality and mode of variation. Using the analytical frame established by this, I interpret a selection of examples as challenges to the instructive-permissive distinction. These examples include the phenomena of developmental plasticity and transdifferentiation, the role of the microbiome in development, and new methodological approaches to standardisation and the assessment of causes. Furthermore, I argue that investigations into organismal development should investigate the effects of a wider range of kinds of variation including variation in the units, modes and temporalities of development. I close by examining various possible opportunities for producing and using normal development free of the assumptions of the instructive-permissive distinction.
methodological because it guides researchers by highlighting what possible variables might be relevant to a causal understanding of the developmental processes or features they are interested in, allowing them to identify some as permissive causes that simply need to be controlled, and others as candidate instructive causes that they may wish to manipulate and vary. On its own terms, normal development is, "in a greater or less degree the response of the developing organism to the normal conditions" (Wilson 1896, 326) . We don't have to deal with the complexity and multidimensionality of the ongoing relations between organisms and their environments, and can unproblematically assume a distinction between the two.
What are the other elements of the existing orthodox framework of modern developmental biology?
As I have noted, it is underpinned by a mutually-supporting framework of theoretical, conceptual, epistemic and methodological elements such as the instructive-permissive distinction, the distinction between organism and environment, and normal development. It delineates what processes, entities and potentially causally-relevant factors exist, which ones are significant, and what concepts make sense of them. It centres on the identification of differential gene expression as the central organising principle for understanding the production of a complex, heterogeneous adult organism from a simpler, relatively homogeneous organism at a prior stage of development (see Pradeu 2014 for a discussion and criticism of this central organising principle). This principle provides a way of resolving the central problem of experimental embryology first raised in the nineteenth-century of how a complex, differentiated organism is produced from a relatively simple undifferentiated singlecell, despite all cells containing exactly the same hereditary material. 4 In different cells, different parts of the genome are switched on or off, upregulated, downregulated, epigenetically marked, in a particular temporal order.
Since the early twentieth-century, the orthodox framework has included concepts like normal development, differentiation, potency, fate, induction, and specification. All of these concepts are used and reproduced in practice by developmental biologists. Recent debates have questioned whether developmental biology is an enterprise in which it is possible to develop theories (Pradeu 2014), or whether it is organised differently, perhaps in terms of a problem or question-centred framework (Love 2014) . By focusing on the challenges to, and the practices associated with, one of the elements of the previously sketched outline of a theoretical framework -normal development -I sidestep this debate. Whether these challenges lead to the formulation of a theory of development, or a reformulation of the problems guiding developmental biologists, is not important here. What is important here is whether key aspects of the existing framework, namely the central organising principle of differential gene expression, the instructive-permissive distinction, and the methodological role of normal development, inhibit the investigation of the role of variation in organismal development, and if so, what alternative approaches might be appropriate.
Problems with the instructive-permissive distinction
In this section I detail objections (explicit and implicit) to the instructive-permissive distinction. They imply that the instructive causes of developmental form may lie outside, as well as inside, the traditionally defined boundaries of the organism. Further, they indicate that there are problems with the way the existing framework of developmental biology conceptualises or treats variation. To identify what aspect of variation is relevant in a particular example, I have identified the following dimensions of variation within development: 3) Mode:
a) Outcome -variation in outcome at defined point of the developmental process, usually an adult stage but not necessarily. Variation in the outcome mode is multifinality.
b) Pathway -variation in the route taken by the developmental process, either to the same outcome (equifinality) or to different outcomes (multifinality).
The different ways these dimensions are conceptualised, measured, investigated, manipulated, standardised, and made background conditions constitute the management of variation. This involves the identification in biological practice of the boundaries of a system, and its partitioning, into organism and environment, or variables and background conditions. It also entails making judgements as to what is causally, and experimentally, relevant. Practices of establishing types also fall under this. For any given unit, a given temporality and mode is instantiated in normal development, and the management of variation -in terms of identification of variables to be manipulated, and background conditions to be controlled -is conditioned by assumptions about normal development as well. In the following examples, I identify what significance these assumptions have for the various ways in which variation can be dealt with. My aim in this is to show that a concept of normal development that relies upon the assumption that there is a single unit, temporality and mode of, and hence way to manage, variation is no longer sustainable, and needs to be replaced with concepts and practices which take account of the possibility that all of these parameters may also vary.
Units of variation -the microbiome's role in development
The need to take account of naturally occurring variation is central to the programme of research into the developmental and physiological effects of the dynamic interactions between metazoans (also known as macrobes) and associated microbial communities. Investigations into those interactions, and the role of microbiota in providing signals or cues as inputs into developmental processes, have inspired much recent philosophical work assessing its significance, some of which I touch upon shortly.
Organisms acquire communities of microbes by direct transmission from the environment, or by transmission into a (female-derived) gamete, or into the developing embryo (McFall-Ngai 2002, 2-5) .
The presence of certain microbes or communities of microbes has been linked to the maintenance of A simple, but classic, example is the association between the Hawaiian bobtail squid Euprymna scolopes, and the luminescent bacterium Vibrio fischeri. Early after hatching, V. fischeri colonise the juvenile squid in an organ, the light organ, at the centre of its body cavity. Once there, the bacteria interact with host epithelial cells, and colonisation by other species of bacteria is prevented by host immune cells. The host provides the bacteria with the sources of carbon, nitrogen and minerals it requires for survival and growth, and once it has established itself the community of bacteria bioluminesces. This light, on the underside of the squid as it feeds nocturnally, prevents the squid from casting a shadow from the moonlight, and therefore increases the squid's chance of avoiding detection by predators (Visick and McFall-Ngai 2000) . The bacteria are provided with a nutrient-rich environment free from competition by other species, and the squid benefits from the bioluminescence, which it could not produce itself. Importantly, the bacteria also play a role in the morphogenesis of the light organ (McFall-Ngai 2002, 8) .
How does the microbiota associated with a host organism affect development? Firstly, there is the possibility that the host organism acquires genes from one or more microbes, a process known as Horizontal Gene Transfer (HGT). Genomic evidence indicates that as well as historically shaping genomes in at least some metazoans, this continues to take place today, and that the transferred genes are expressed (Crisp et al. 2015) . Secondly, and undoubtedly more commonly, there are the epigenetic effects of microbiota on host gene expression, for instance by DNA methylation Thomas Pradeu, who argues that the mechanisms underpinning the immunotolerance of symbiotic bacteria exist because the developing organism requires the presence of certain communities of microorganism at certain periods of development, important aspects of which continue even into maturity. As a consequence of this need for the host organism to tolerate and even acquire and incorporate microbes for their "crucial" and "indispensable" roles in development, the distinction between organism and environment is preserved, but only if the organism is considered to be the "unity" of a "plurality" (Pradeu 2011). The organism maintains its distinction from the environment, by selectively incorporating parts of the environment into its own self, or to join the holobiont of which it is part.
If one does not accept this (and Pradeu's argument is dependent on accepting a particular hypothesis concerning the developmental function of certain immune system mechanisms), provided one does not make the assumption that the source of instructive causes must be internal to the organism, then microbiota surely contribute instructive causes. If, however, we do accept Pradeu's argument for the concept of the holobiont, the microbiota that manifest instructive causes in the developmental processes of a host are now considered to be internal to the holobiont or Pradeuian organism. If the composition of the microbial communities is specified by the holobiont as a whole, any instructive causes manifested by the microbial part of this could ultimately be attributed back to the holobiont, which selects the microbes manifesting instructive causes of some use to it. Even in non-pathological circumstances however, the host would not be in a position to completely specify the composition of the microbial communities with which it associated. Microbes that did not provide important instructive signals may be tolerated. Additionally, microbes that might have provided helpful signals may not be present. The availability of particular communities of microbes depends on environmental factors. Thus, the instructive causes exhibited by the microbes integrated into an organism would therefore rely, in part, on the environment outside of the original host organism before it is colonised. In many circumstances, therefore, the microbiota can be regarded as playing an instructive causal role, regardless of one's conception of the relationship between host and microbiota.
One of the key problems with the instructive-permissive distinction is that it allots the former part of the distinction to 'internal factors' and the latter part to 'external factors', or 'the environment'. It therefore limits the kinds of variation that are deemed to be important to investigate to elucidate the causes involved in the production of developmental outcomes. If the constitution of microbiotic communities in organisms is conceived to have an environmental source (even if one does not consider the microbiome itself to be part of the environment) the role of the microbiome in development and health demonstrates that the instructive-permissive distinction as an heuristic means of identifying which variation is methodologically and theoretically important, is deeply flawed.
It is in the ongoing dynamic variation in and between microbial communities in different developing individual organisms, and their relationship to that developing individual organism, that scientists make sense of the reciprocal, iterative relationships between the macrobe and its succeeding microbiotic communities in the development of both. This requires not only a serious focus on the investigation and importance of microbiome variation, but also on the dissolution of the framework of developmental biology which is centred on the instructive-permissive distinction that inhibits biologists' ability to explore the variation in a wider range of ontogenetically-related units. The microbiome's role in development is one example of the way in which the formulation of new explananda require the forging of new explanantia and ways of constructing them. Two more examples are the phenomena of developmental plasticity and transdifferentiation.
Modes of variation -developmental plasticity and transdifferentiation
Plasticity is defined as "the ability of an organism to react to an external or internal environmental input with a change in form, state, movement, or rate of activity," and we might add, developmental fate (West-Eberhard 2003, 33) . It therefore responds to, and creates, variation. The processes involved in developmental or phenotypic plasticity and the process of differentiation are opposing, the former widening developmental cell fate, the latter supposedly narrowing it (Bateson and has been demonstrated to be an evolutionarily primitive, rather than derived, state (Nijhout 2003).
In evolutionary history there was therefore no default phenotype for ancestral forms of extant organisms, and in organisms that have retained plasticity this may remain the case.
Contingent events (which include stochastic events within the organism) are not 'accidents', and the response of the organism to them should be an important target of biological research, instead of merely studying the response to reliable, controlled, and predictable conditions. After all, developmental or phenotypic plasticity is the response of an organism to changing and varying What is important about them is that there is not a default phenotype. An example which exhibits a greater range of possible phenotypes (and, within one individual organism, phenotypic heterogeneity) is angiogenesis and the formation of an integrated vascular network, in which the endothelium is in constant interaction with the tissue environments it encounters (Aird 2012). The variation in pathways and outcomes of development also includes heterochrony, a change in the timing of developmental events, which is defined as "a series of morphological states through which a given embryonic structure passes" that "reflect distinct changes in the embryo" (Bininda-Emonds et al. 2002, 299 Developmental plasticity depends on the capacity of the organism not merely to react to the environment, but to use cues from the environment as signals to be interpreted by developmental processes. These cues can therefore constitute instructive causes of the products of those developmental processes (Gilbert 2003a). The organism can therefore evolve developmental processes that allow them to detect cues and respond to environmental conditions in such a way as to produce a functional outcome (Whitman and Agrawal 2009, 12) . 7 In this way, the phenotypic plasticity of the organism can be exploited to enhance fitness (Nijhout 2003) . Given plasticity, the range of relevant variation (be it internally or externally induced) that can produce functional organisms at a given end-point is therefore widened -a wider range of variation becomes relevant for understanding the variation between forms of a given type.
As questions of the origin of phenotypic variation are central to evo-devo investigations, Love has criticised the ways that certain practices in evo-devo excessively abstract from variation. If too much variation is abstracted away, phenotypic plasticity would present itself to a far lesser extent. His proposed solution is to use a greater range of model organisms and create alternative periodizations or stagings, based on using different characters to those currently used in normal stages. This would ensure that periodizations are not collapsed into a single periodization only, and that, as a consequence, variations would be revealed rather than abstracted away (Love 2010).
6 This concept of heterochrony is inclusive of more kinds of variation than the changes in size and shape dealt with by Stephen J. Gould and Pere Alberch (see Smith 2002) . 7 The type of plasticity in which the result of the environmental input is mediated by the developmental processes of the organism is known as active plasticity, and can be contrasted with passive plasticity, in which the environmental input (such as temperature) is directly proportional to the extent of the change effected (for example by increased temperature speeding up certain metabolic processes) (Forsman 2014, 3).
Another problem is that even though the production and distribution of particular strains of model organisms aim at standardisation and a reduction in variation between individual organisms, evidence indicates that considerable (biologically relevant) variation remains (Carlson Jones and German 2005) . If it does -and it would take investigation of what variation exists and is biologically relevant to demonstrate this in particular cases -then to fail to take account of it in experimental design and the interpretation of results is to allow an unwarranted assumption and source of error to remain. If, however, the variation were controlled, measured and noted, or made into an extra experimental variable, not only would this error be avoided, but it might provide useful information that would have otherwise been missed.
Conventionally, the process of development is envisaged as a hierarchical process of differentiation.
Germ-layers are specified, then tissues, then cell-types. Cells become ever more differentiated. With the exception of stem-cells, this is conceived as a one-way process towards terminal differentiation.
However, growing empirical evidence suggests that this may not be the case, and that rather than being terminally differentiated, it might be more appropriate to say that mature cells exhibit stable question the view that differentiation is necessarily a hierarchical and one-way process, or even that a cell can be ever be described as fully differentiated (Sánchez Alvarado and Yamanaka 2014).
As with developmental plasticity, transdifferentiation leads one to consider the equifinality and multifinality of developmental processes. Given that equifinality and multifinality can be manifested in development, the variation in processes and outcomes of development, as well as the variation in the (internal and external) factors and processes that affect these, is an important part of understanding organismal development. In addition to the variation in factors, there may also be variation in the reliability or stability of their presence in the life cycles of organisms. The variation in that reliability, and also in the temporality, may also be worthy of investigation.
Rather than transdifferentiation being merely an exception to the 'normal' model of hierarchical and irreversible differentiation, the causes underpinning it may in fact constitute one developmental process or tendency that interact or counteract with other tendencies as part of the developmental process as a whole. Other processes that may act in this way besides transdifferentiation may include stochastic processes in cells (Kupiec 2014). Due to the presence of potentially antagonistic or opposing processes and tendencies, the maintenance of a (stable) differentiated state is itself an active process -there is for example the need to faithfully transmit epigenetic marks through DNA replication and cell-division (Bateson and Gluckman 2011, 58).
The phenomena of transdifferentiation therefore directly challenge the central organising principle of differential gene expression. The product of differentiation is the variation in cell types at a particular point in time. As the product of the maintenance of these varied differentiated states, the variation in cell types can be attributed to the ongoing active stabilisation of that variation (Minelli 2014). Therefore, the existence of that variation can be attributed to a wider set of causes beyond the genealogy of a particular cell, and its history of differential gene expression. To understand the existence, persistence and potential fate of differentiated cell types therefore requires investigation of a greater range of causal factors than at present. Furthermore, in challenging the conception of development as a one-way process with a default way of unfolding, the phenomenon of transdifferentiation lends support to critiques of "adultocentric" conceptions of development in which development is conceived as the finalistic process of producing an adult from an egg (Minelli and significant over different temporalities.
Management of variation -experimental conditions and assessing causal factors
Standard laboratory methodology dictates that factors which are not being tested must be held constant, as invariant background conditions, while one is conducting a scientific experiment.
However, while this reduction in the variation of factors may help to improve test sensitivity, there are indications that it may hinder the reproducibility of results. For example, Richter et al. (2009) argue, based on data analysis they conducted on behavioural research conducted in multiple different laboratories, that despite the considerable efforts to standardize conditions between laboratories, this is not in fact possible, and that the effect of this is that they "standardize to different local environments." Consequently, the generalizability and reproducibility of findings produced in such circumstances must be called into question.
An alternative to strict standardisation they propose is the employment of "systematic environmental variation," or "heterogenization" (ibid.). 8 Here, changing the practices of managing variation in the experimental set-up is crucial. While scientists are assiduous in ensuring that every conceivable variable in the 'background conditions' are controlled, it may not always be possible to either control known variables or even apprehend certain variables. The craft of working in a particular laboratory ameliorates this somewhat, but the strategy of heterogenization, of incorporating a wider array of explicit variation in the experimental set-up, provides a way to ameliorate it still further. The history of agricultural science demonstrates that when scientists have needed to deal with multiple environmental variables, which they may not be able to sufficiently control but need to take account of, they have been able to develop methods of managing this 8 The proposers of heterogenization believe that it is just as valuable a strategy within a single laboratory as between multiple laboratories. The preceding examples have shown that it is no longer valid to strictly partition the world into a dichotomy of internal and external. The way that variation is managed, and the causal relevance of certain types of variation for given outcomes of interest, should depend instead on a more explicitly articulated justification for dividing the system up into potentially relevant causes and background conditions. More varying factors would be incorporated into the realm of potentially relevant causes than in the analogous category of internal, and there would need to be more explicit reasons within the context of the research situation for making certain potentially varying factors invariant. The ways of measuring causal specificity and the strategy of heterogenization offer ways to do this that can be explored and developed.
Opportunities and possibilities
All of the preceding objections are rooted in a rejection of the instructive-permissive distinction. The examples given in the preceding section indicate that the way in which the distinction conceptualises and manages variation is questionable. It precludes us, at least some cases, from apprehending or investigating the origin and significance of the range of variation present in nature, not merely in and between genomes, but also other manifestations of variation. The role of the microbiome and the phenomena of developmental plasticity and transdifferentiation call into question the idea that there is a single unit, mode and temporality to developmental processes in any given type (such as, but not restricted to, a given species or variety) of organisms. These, and the new methods proposed in two of the other examples (heterogenization and assessing the causal relevance of potential variables), undermine the justification for unequivocally identifying the unit of variation by partitioning based on a firm distinctions between organism and environment, internal and external, or even intrinsic and extrinsic factors. If context is important (in the sense of being instructive), and it varies, this variation must be investigated. The distinction therefore prevents us from developing the tools and knowledge to investigate that variation and its role in health, disease, conservation, and other fields where a more naturalistic understanding might bear fruit in the laboratory, and from the laboratory to arenas of human activity. Consequently, it will be productive to identify ways in which variation can be conceptualised and managed in experimental set-ups (aiming to explore particular questions) that are congruent with the way that variation has been demonstrated to be relevant across the full range of its dimensions.
I am not new in desiring a biology which incorporates a wide range of interacting varying factors. In fact, at the very dawn of biology as a science, G. R. Treviranus outlined such a programme (Grene and Depew 2004) . This failed to happen because the statistical and computational tools were not present, and it was not possible to produce the amount of data needed for findings to be statistically significant. Furthermore, the experimentalisation of embryology which might have newly instantiated such a desire, needed to introduce the instructive-permissive distinction and its methodological and epistemic consequences in order to proceed. For early experimental embryology, the instructive-permissive distinction was a way of managing variation. At that point the technical means to investigate the full complexity of ontogenetic processes that were becoming apparent were either absent or underdeveloped. This, I contend, is no longer the case, and the instructive-permissive distinction, which has become entrenched in developmental biology, is no longer required. We have the computing power and the statistical tools to deal with multivariate complexity. We are now aware of the shortcomings of the instructive-permissive distinction, and have the means to produce, analyse and interpret large amounts of data concerning embryonic Such problems include focusing on one feature as a primary criterion and assuming that all other features associated with it at a particular stage are also present or absent. This is a custom borne of practical need but it inhibits the apprehension of variation, such as variation in the timing of the appearance of particular structures.
There remain many problems. One is that if experimenters were to measure more variation, and use this to divide up samples, they will be left with very small sub-samples, below the numbers needed for statistical significance. 9 Another is that if biologists were to produce local standards, aside from the practical considerations, it raises problems concerning how the data produced using those local standards can travel beyond the context in which they were produced. In silico methods offer a possible solution, but these approaches still require the input of high-quality data. Additionally, in part to satisfy community standards, in silico methods require in vivo validation after results are produced (Leonelli 2014b). Inspiration might be drawn from tools that are developed to integrate small datasets produced in different contexts for different purposes, an acute issue in ecology (but also plant science, see Leonelli 2008a). Part of the solution there is to formulate and adopt standards concerning data collection, the recording of the "structure, content and appropriate usage" of data, and the development and use of software to ensure that data are able to travel outside its particular context of production (Madin et al. 2008 , a discussion of the challenges of using ontologies in ecology; see also Leonelli 2008b).
The elaboration and development of some of the methods outlined above could generate new ways of producing and using normal development, ones that encompass all variation deemed to be normal. These would be normal developments that would incorporate the observed results of the exposure of embryos to multiple contextual environments. 
Conclusion
Since the late nineteenth-century, the allied ontological concepts and practical precepts associated I have already begun the task of identifying some changes (and conceptualising them as part of a wider whole), but this requires considerable development, elaboration, and collaboration.
At the moment the formal fiction is that there is a formal boundary between normal development as a (descriptive) standard or control, and a more normative conception of normal development that is grounded in the instructive-permissive distinction and an ontological separation of organism and environment. Only by highlighting the links between a conception of normal development tightly linked to the prevailing problematic theoretical framework of developmental biology and the role of normal development as a standard in biological experiments can we begin to identify how standards of normal development can be developed that minimise those links. I have advocated basing new standards of normal development incorporating different dimensions of variation on determinations of functional level. To further these proposals, work will be required to elaborate how these different standards can co-exist, and how functional level is to be determined for structures and processes over different time frames of ontogenesis.
